The paper concludes with a discussion of reasons for the rapid reversal of its previous reforms and provides recommendations to achieve a civil, civil system of immigration enforcement for families and all others, which means nothing less than the transformation of the immigrant detention system from a criminal to a civil paradigm, consistent with the population and legal authorities. 2 The need for such an effort is all the more urgent in light of executive actions taken in the early days of the Trump administration and their initial outcomes. Among those thwarting admissions are orders to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US 1 Dora Schriro served as senior advisor to US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet Napolitano and then as US Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) first director of the Office of Detention Policy and Planning (ODPP) at the beginning of President Obama's first term. During the latter part of the administration's second term, Secretary Jeh Johnson formed the DHS Advisory Committee on Family Residential Facility (ACFRC) and selected her as a subject matter expert in detention to serve as a member. Schriro has also served as a commissioner on both the American Bar Association's Commission on Immigration and the Women's Refugee Commission. 2 For further discussion of the concept of a civil, civil system of immigration enforcement, see Schriro (2009). children, dramatically increased. Initially, the government responded by releasing children to a parent or legal guardian and then holding any remaining children in border detention facilities and tent shelters (Olivas 1990) . For a time, it also housed entire families of Central American migrants in large American Red Cross camps along the Texas-Mexico border (Bolton 1994; Lodi News-Sentinel 1989) .
In 1996, Congress passed both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 5 markedly changing US immigration law. Among the amendments adversely affecting families were the creation of an expedited removal process and the significant expansion of categories of persons subject to mandatory detention. In March 2001, INS, the precursor to the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), converted a county nursing home in Berks County, Pennsylvania, into the Berks County Family Residential Center (Berks), the nation's first "modern" facility to temporarily detain migrant families undergoing administrative immigration proceedings or who were otherwise subject to mandatory detention (BFRC 2009 ). Berks County owns the then 84-bed facility and operated it for the INS initially, and for ICE subsequently, pursuant to a contract.
For a time, Berks was the government's only detention center for families with underaged children (families). 6 The facility was secure but smaller and the grounds greener than the family residential centers (FRC) that followed and its programs were generally more progressive than were those at adult detention centers. Still, ICE routinely separated older children from their parents and assigned them to rooms with non-familial adults of the same sex. Until recently, it was the only licensed FRC; now, none of the three currently in operation are licensed. 7 In early 2016, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services Berks revoked Berks' license.
In 1997, the Flores v. Meese lawsuit, concerning the rights of unaccompanied children in immigration custody, resulted in a Stipulated Settlement Agreement (Flores Agreement) setting out nationwide policy. 8 The Flores Agreement addressed the children's placement in the "least restrictive setting" -indeed, a licensed, non-secure facility -only when necessary, and then for no more than several days, 9 in order to make an informed determination of removal or relief to protect their rights and ensure their well-being (see DOJ 2001).
5 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 , Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996 ; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 , Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996 . 6 Since its opening through spring 2016, Berks accepted fathers as well as mothers and their children. ICE has always restricted the use of Karnes and Dilley (as well as Artesia before it closed) to mothers and their children. It separated the majority of fathers from their children, assigning most of them instead to a detention facility for single, adult males and releasing the remainder. 7 The states, not the US government, licenses facilities operating within their jurisdictions. Licensing practices vary widely by state; there is no one set of minimum expectations to which all states adhere. 8 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Meese, (C.D. Cal. 17 January 1997) . For cases culminating in the settlement agreement, see Flores v. Meese, (CD Cal. 30 November 1987); Flores v. Meese, No. 85-4544-RJK(Px) (CD Cal. 25 May 1988); Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991 (1990); Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (1992 and Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) . 9 The Agreement stipulated release would occur within three days, if the minor was apprehended in an INS district in which a licensed program is located and had space available; and otherwise within five days pursuant to Paragraph 19 (ibid.).
Under the Flores Agreement, the government would release unaccompanied minors to the care of their parents or other family members whenever possible; otherwise, it would place them in foster homes or licensed facilities providing age-appropriate programs. In 2002, Congress transferred the care of unaccompanied minors as prescribed in the Flores Agreement 10 legislatively to the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).
11 The custody of families continues to be ICE's responsibility.
Detention Policy Changes after 9/11
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11), the government fortified immigration law enforcement, resulting in further changes to family detention policies. Congress passed the Homeland Security Act 12 in 2002, creating the DHS, absorbing INS and subdividing it into three new agencies within DHS: ICE, USCIS, and CBP.
13 Soon afterwards, the expedited removal process was expanded to encompass some asylum seekers and other migrants crossing US land borders (DHS 2004) , which resulted in detention, the preferred management strategy, and disproportionately affected families. The US largely abandoned its pre-9/11 policies of either releasing families or detaining them in family units and, instead, separated parents from their children and one another, detaining the adults and sending the children including infants and toddlers, to facilities operated by ORR. The involuntary separation of parents from their children had the effect of rendering the children "unaccompanied" for legal purposes (see WRC and LIRS 2007; LIRS 2014) .
Congress took notice. In 2005, the House Appropriations Committee directed DHS to stop separating families: "The Committee expects DHS to release families or use alternatives to detention such as the Intensive Supervised Appearance Program whenever possible. When detention of family units is necessary, the Committee directs DHS to use appropriate detention space to house them together."
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The Berks and Hutto Family Residential Centers DHS did not release more families or increase its use of alternatives to detention; instead, it expanded secure capacity to detain more families. In May 2006, ICE opened a second and larger facility, the 512-bed T. Don Hutto Family Residential Center (Hutto) in Taylor,  Texas, 15 to detain mothers and their children. Neither its physical plant and programs nor its policies and practices were age-appropriate or family-friendly. The cinderblock facility had no windows, the corridors were long, and metal bars on windows and solid steel doors 10 See footnote 8. 11 The Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002 , § 462, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 , was enacted on 25 November 2002 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § § 101-613 (2011)). 12 Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 107-296, 116 Stat. (2002 . 13 ICE is responsible for immigration enforcement. USCIS handles all matters pertaining to immigration benefits and the granting of citizenship to non-nationals. CBP secures the borders whereas the US Coast Guard patrols and protects the coastline (see https://www.dhs.gov/). 14 H.R. Rep. 109-79, at 38 (2005) . 15 ICE operates Hutto under an Intergovernmental Service Agreement with Williamson Co., Texas, which contracts with Corrections Corporation of America for the facility's day-to-day operations (ICE 2011). still remained in place from the time that the facility housed adult male sheriff's prisoners. Movement within the facility and access to the grounds were severely restricted and ageappropriate programs were negligible. There were reoccurring reports of questionable medical and mental health care resulting in weight loss, depression, and other documented conditions.
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Congress soon concluded that Hutto, a former medium security prison for adult male inmates, still operated as an adult correctional facility, and criticized both Berks and Hutto, noting that although Berks was more "homelike" than Hutto, it also failed to afford children the least restrictive setting, as required per the Flores Agreement.
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In March 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and others challenged ICE's enforcement practices, arguing that using Hutto to detain families violated the rights of the detained minors. The lawsuit charged that ICE impermissibly separated children from their parents, detained them illegally, and treated them as prisoners, contrary to the Flores Agreement.
18 Plaintiffs also asserted ICE's actions violated Congress's repeated instructions to DHS to: (1) keep families together whenever possible; (2) release families together whenever possible; (3) employ the least restrictive alternatives to detention; and (4) when detention was necessary, place families in normalized settings. In August 2007, ICE entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs, 19 concurring in part to: use Hutto as a placement of last resort; improve the physical plant and its policies and procedures so it was less prison-like; professionalize the workforce; routinely review detained individuals' eligibility for reassignment to less restrictive settings; and adopt transparent operating standards.
Late in 2007, ICE promulgated Family Residential Standards for the operation of Berks and Hutto (see ICE, n.d.) its stated purpose was to set minimum expectations for those facilities' safety and security, staff selection and training, program services, and medical care. In fact, ICE used standards created by the American Correctional Association (ACA) to guide jailors. The ACA premised its standards upon adult corrections case law specific to pre-trial adult defendants. ICE did not recognize the standards for what they were or intended to do and kept them largely intact after a limited window for public comment closed. As such, it afforded families only a few personal possessions, restricted their movement in the facility and on the grounds, and curtailed their access to counsel. The standards were also advisory, with limited provision for sanctions and only a few penalties for non-compliance in place. ICE delegated to others the monitoring of the facilities for compliance with the standards.
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Amongst the limited and ill-advised instruction it provided, ICE directed the monitors to announce their inspections in advance and to conduct their tours only during business hours. Even under these favorable conditions, FRC operators and ICE administrators alike often argued for the adjustment of the monitors' final scores before they released them, and typically senior managers at headquarters capitulated. Without checks and balances and with only negligible consequences in place, Berks and Hutto usually received favorable reviews. In those infrequent instances that a monitor documented a deficiency, ICE rarely imposed penalties or cancelled a contract.
Reforms to Detention Policy and Practice in 2009
Early in 2009, shortly after President Obama took office, DHS undertook a comprehensive assessment of detention policy and practice, with the goals of reducing reliance on detention and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of ICE. DHS Secretary Napolitano appointed me to the newly established position of special advisor on ICE to focus on the significant growth in immigration detention and ICE arrest priorities (DHS 2009 ). I commenced a national study including the inspection of more than 25 of the most problematic facilities and immediately began making changes. Among the first steps taken, ICE removed all of the families at Hutto (Bernstein 2009 ). As many families as possible were released; the rest were transferred to Berks. In September 2009, after ICE removed the last of the families -lowering the total number of FRC beds from 384 to its original capacity of 84 -it recommissioned Hutto as an all-female, adult-only facility.
I also wrote a report about the system-wide assessment of the country's detention practices, released by DHS in October 2009 (Schriro 2009 ). The report included recommendations that laid the groundwork for a number of reforms that DHS announced around the time of its release to improve conditions for all detained individuals including special populations -notably women, families, and asylum seekers -and to expand appreciably communitybased alternatives to detention. Other recommendations realized during this time included the detainee locator database, death-in-detention notifications, an objective risk assessment instrument normed specifically for the ICE population, and assigned, independent on-site contract monitors.
Among the report's findings, none was more important than this: In federal fiscal year (FFY) 2008, ICE operated the largest detention and community-release programs in the countrylarger than the US Federal Bureau of Prisons or any of the biggest states' correctional systems -with 378,582 migrants from 221 countries in its custody or under its supervision during the year. It was also the most ill-equipped of any agency to assume these responsibilities. ICE consisted primarily of law enforcement personnel whose orientation and expertise centered on enforcing immigration law but not in the execution of detention activities and community-based alternatives. The agency lacked the organizational infrastructure, the will and the way, needed to execute this critical component of its mission (Schriro 2009 ). The widespread lack of interest and expertise in matters other than enforcement, coupled with policy shifts towards increased reliance upon detention, consistent with the workforce's disdain for the population and its preference for punitive practices, accelerated and exacerbated ICE's reliance on contractors.
21 Inside the administration, the champions for change diminished in number and soon redirected to other pressing issues of the day. Today, ICE is still the nation's largest system of incapacitation with 783,454 migrants from 21 One of the few changes that ICE initiated after the release of the report was to change the name of the unit that performed ICE's detention activities from Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) to Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), reasserting its view of its core mission.
178 countries in its custody or under its supervision annually (ACFRC 2016, 25) , and it is no more adept now than when DHS released the report. During its last year in office, ICE deported 240,255 immigrants.
22 Between the administration's first year in office and its last, ICE increased its capacity to detain families from 84 beds in 2009 to 3,750 beds in 2016.
The report identified several significant steps that the administration could take to transform ICE from a substantively penal to a civil system. One, it argued that ICE should premise decision making upon the likelihood of eligibility for relief and a presumption of release to the community as the rule rather than the exception. Two, ICE should establish clear standards of care based upon community standards and civil case law, and not penal practices. Three, it should put an organizational infrastructure in place with the requisite management tools and informational systems that included objective assessment instruments and classification tools to continuously inform and align care, custody restrictions, programs, privileges, and delivery of services consistent with individually assessed risk and need. Four, it must ensure meaningful access to legal materials and counsel, to a viable grievance mechanism, as well as to visitation, religious practice, and translation services. Five, it must establish a health care system comparable to other government-funded programs and extend its coverage through release to the community or removal from the United States. Six and last, it must implement a system of rigorous and independent oversight by expert federal officials to monitor conditions for compliance, to timely publish objective findings, to take remedial steps, and to impose proportionate sanctions for non-compliance.
In short, the report urged ICE to put in place an informed plan of action to improve decision making, activities, and outcomes. Adoption would commit the agency to full transparency, to increase its accountability to others and most fundamentally, to comply with the law.
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DHS adopted the report in its entirety and published it on its website where it remained throughout the Obama administration. ICE agreed to temper its use of detention and it imposed excessive supervision requirements on those released to the community. For a time, the momentum was palpable. ICE put a number of plans into place to lower cost and yield better results, among them establishing the Office of Detention Policy and Planning (ODPP) within ICE to oversee the implementation of the remaining recommendations in the 2009 report.
24 ODPP took substantive steps to enhance oversight and improve accountability during the first year of the first term but overall, reform of the system faltered. It was not among the administration's top priorities and countervailing enforcement policies quickly overtook this initiative.
The Road to Hell Was Paved with Good Intentions
Most fundamentally, DHS's core mission is emergency preparedness and preparation for all manner of incursions, both natural and manufactured, foreign and domestic. Specific to immigration, adoption of this posture would ensure that in the event of an increase 22 During 2016, the last year of the Obama administration, immigration deportation rose another 2 percent (Jordan 2016 in arriving asylum seekers, for example, the government would be ready to respondlawfully, efficiently, and effectively. Despite DHS' best intentions in 2009 to make civil detention more civil for families and others in its custody, ICE failed to take many of the needed steps to that end. Specific to immigration detention, appropriate action would have entailed ensuring that the family residential facilities comply with the Flores Agreement that INS reached in 1997 and in which ICE is still embroiled, and ensuring that families are detained only when absolutely necessary, for the briefest time necessary and then, only in non-secure, family-friendly, licensed child care facilities. 25 Instead, ICE continues to defend the egregious practices that caused so much difficulty for INS, among them using unlicensed and secure facilities, the very antitheses to the principles, policies, and practices that DHS embraced in the Flores Agreement. Lacking all manner of strategic thinking and age-appropriate responses, the likelihood that an enforcement agency would continue to default to enforcement strategies in an emergency was great. Similarly, the government's repeated failure to make good faith and sustained efforts to comply with that agreement, ultimately limited its options to successfully manage the humanitarian crisis that was about to unfold.
The Influx in Migrant Families at the Southwestern US Border in the Summer of 2014
The arrival of families and children seeking the protection of the US government along the southwest US border from Central America in the summer of 2014 triggered an immediate and severe response by the administration (Preston and Randal 2014) . Unlawful crossings at the border were at an historic low, but the increased number of children and families presented unique challenges. The women and children were fleeing highly organized, transnational gang activity and various forms of violence and extreme poverty in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (also known as the Northern Triangle) and they were seeking safety, protection, and family reunification in the United States.
26 Thousands of families, mostly children and their mothers, traveled north from Central America, fleeing gang murders and pervasive violence, to the southwest border of the United States in search of protection. 27 In FFY 2014, CBP apprehended 68,445 parents and children traveling together at the US-Mexico border (CBP, n.d.) .
Characterizing this humanitarian situation as a threat to national security, the administration responded with a statement from DHS Secretary Johnson, who emphasized the need for marked increases in detention and deportation in order to send a "message" to deter future migration (DHS 2014) .
Reasons for the Increase in Migrants from Central America in Summer 2014
It was primarily increased transnational criminal organization activity, 28 violence from other sources, extreme poverty, and the desire for family reunification that led to the increase in border crossings by mothers with their children and by unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle in 2014 (Kennedy 2014) . Violence seemed to be the single greatest motivation, even when considering all of the other factors (AIC 2014). In interviews with unaccompanied children, boys and girls alike cited crime, gang threats, and violence as reasons for leaving home (Kenney 2014).
29 Children and adolescents were particularly at risk of transnational gangs' attention, with boys targeted for involuntary recruitment and girls to service its members (UNHCR 2014). Mothers and their children also fled domestic and gender-based persecution, both common in the Northern Triangle, and often linked to gang and societal violence (Equiziba et al. 2015) .
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The number of mothers and children arriving from the Northern Triangle countries slowed by late fall 2015, then began to rise again. A public relations campaign in Central America funded by the US government intended to deter immigration, and US training and assistance intended to increase deportations by Mexico (WOLA 2015; Ortega 2015) made it more difficult for families to reach the US border. Through it all, DHS continued to expand its family detention capacity by, first, repurposing a federal training barrack in Artesia, New Mexico, as the Artesia FRC (Artesia), and shortly afterwards by closing the controversial facility; by converting Karnes, an adult male detention center to the Karnes FRC (Karnes); by enlarging both Dilley and Berks FRCs; and by hardening community release. During the first four months of FFY 2016, CBP apprehended 24,616 Central American families at the US-Mexico border, a significant drop from FFY 2014. When ICE released families from detention, it increasingly conditioned release upon electronic supervision (PRI 2016) .
The Obama Administration's Response
The Obama administration was conflicted and its response was confusing. In the summer of 2014, it designated the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), another agency of DHS, to organize and coordinate a federal response to the increase in arrivals of unaccompanied children and families at the US-Mexico border (White House 2014a), many of whom appeared to be eligible for asylum and related protections under US law. Even as it struggled to address the rapidly unfolding humanitarian crisis, the White House was responding to calls to stop unlawful migration with enhanced enforcement measures.
President Obama asked Congress for approximately $4 billion in emergency funds (Rogers 2014) , intending to use some of it to increase the capacity of the immigration courts to adjudicate more claims faster and the rest, to expand ICE's detention and supervision capacities (White House 2014b). Although the administration did not receive these monies, it still increased the detention of families of Central American asylum seekers. However, it did not request, nor did Congress allocate, funds for legal counsel for minors or additional immigration judges to handle the influx. Instead, Vice President Biden sought to engage the legal community in discussions about its obligation to respond to the immigration crisis along the border, urging them to increase their collective efforts to provide counsel to the population.
Changes at Berks
ICE relocated Berks to a larger building on the grounds of the county compound in 2012 and raised the capacity from 84 to 96 secure beds. In 2014, when the administration changed its detention policy, remanding more families and holding them longer, Berks -the only FRC at the time -filled up quickly. Whereas ICE had only detained families briefly up to that point, time in detention rose precipitously. Longer stays resulted in a need for more beds; the third floor of the building was renovated, doubling its capacity (Orozco and Turner 2015; HRF 2015a) . Just about that time, the State of Pennsylvania revisited the county's authority to license the facility as a family residential center and determined it could only be licensed to house children, and not children with their parents, under state law. The county appealed and the state responded. The state permitted Berks to continue to operate during the pendency of the process, but prohibited any use of the recently added beds.
31 At the time of publication, the appeal was still pending.
The Opening and Closing of Artesia
Late in June 2014, ICE opened the Artesia Family Residential Center (Artesia) in Artesia, New Mexico. Located in the state's far southeastern corner, ICE repurposed a CBP training barracks to function as a secure facility with a capacity of 672 beds, for mothers and their children. Appreciably larger than either Berks or Hutto and every bit as ill-suited, ICE added Artesia with the goal of quickly moving Central American families through the removal process to expedite their deportation (Burnett 2014; Lorca 2014) .
Artesia attracted an onslaught of criticism (Redmon 2014; DWN 2014) . Amongst its many problems, there were no immigration lawyers in the community and none nearby when it opened. When counsel did arrive, ICE impeded their access to the population by practices that appeared to affirm a growing concern that the policies and practices it had put in place accelerated the deportation of families, without regard to their eligibility for asylum. The passage rate for credible fear screening interviews was significantly below the national average (see USCIS 2014; ICE, n.d.) and bond amounts were set five times above the national average (Lorca 2014) .
Within months, amidst increasing negative publicity about significant due process delays and concerns about conditions of confinement, ICE closed Artesia in mid-December 2014 (Manning 2014) . ICE insisted that the facility had been opened on a temporary basis and, with fewer families entering the country; it was time to transition to less isolated and betterdesigned facilities (Redmon 2014) . ICE reassigned any of the families remaining at Artesia at the time of its closure to Karnes and Dilley (McCabe 2014).
The Conversion of Karnes Adult Detention Center to a Family Facility and Its Expansion
At the beginning of August 2014, ICE repurposed a county-owned secure facility in Karnes City, Texas, that it had been using to detain adult males in immigration proceedings, largely asylum seekers, to hold mothers and their children (ICE 2012 (ICE , 2014 . In both iterations, ICE contracted with the Karnes County Commission (Commission), which in turn contracted with the GEO Group, Inc., the country's second largest private prison corporation. ICE changed the name of the facility from the Karnes Civil Detention Center to the Karnes Family Residential Center (Karnes), but little else changed. It continues to operate on a rigid schedule with set times for meals and lights on and out, frequent head counts and room checks throughout the day and night, and its guards are ill-equipped to interact appropriately with mothers and children, many of whom are trauma survivors, seeking asylum.
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Initially, Karnes' capacity was 532 mothers and children (ICE 2012) . In December 2014, after a contentious debate, the Commission approved a 626-bed expansion, increasing its capacity to 1,158, ICE's largest FRC to date. When the work was completed late in 2015 (GEO Group 2014), it was still a secure facility and it still was not licensed by the state for families (Waslin 2016) .
The Development of Dilley
In December 2014, DHS opened its third, and even larger, secure facility to replace Artesia (ICE 2014) -the South Texas Family Residential Center (Dilley) in Dilley, Texas, with a capacity for 2,400 women and children. In its announcement, DHS stated Dilley would "provide invaluable surge capacity should apprehensions of adults with children once again rise." The Corrections Corporation of America, the country's largest for-profit prison corporation, owns and operates Dilley (Waslin 2016) . As is the case with the other FRCs, Dilley is not licensed to detain families (see CCA, n.d.; HRF 2015b).
The Impact of the Deterrence Rationale on Family Detention Policies
In June 2014, the administration announced that it would pursue wide-scale detention of mothers and children to deter other families from seeking asylum in the United States. DHS Secretary Johnson told Congress, "Our message is clear to those who try to illegally cross our borders: You will be sent back home." Underscoring the department's resolve, he added that the government was "building additional space to detain these groups and hold them until their expedited removal orders are effectuated" (DHS 2014b). It was, he said, ". . . [a]n aggressive deterrence strategy focused on the removal and repatriation of recent border crossers."
33 Immediately thereafter, when ICE agents apprehended families at the border, they assigned them to a FRC for expedited processing.
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In keeping with this rationale, DHS insisted on continued detention during proceedings after families received a favorable decision following the "credible fear" screening interviews. Between June 2014 and February 2015, ICE denied release to nearly all detained families in its initial custody determination, even those who had passed their screening interviews.
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When families sought reviews of decisions to continue detention before immigration judges, ICE attorneys opposed release, arguing that a "no bond" or "high bond" policy was necessary to "significantly reduce the unlawful mass migration of Guatemalans, Hondurans and Salvadorans."
36 Notwithstanding ICE's position, when families were able to secure counsel and proceed to a full bond hearing in court, the judges often ordered that bond be set at a level enabling families to achieve release. ICE's policy of detaining for deterrence achieved one of its intended results -imposition of lengthy delays for families, even after they had established viable asylum claims.
33 Declarations of high-ranking immigration officials filed in court proceedings affirmed that it implemented "no bond" or "high bond" policies to reduce the migration of Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans to the United States (see DHS 2014c). 34 Only in the summer of 2015 did the government begin to place some detained families immediately into full-fledged proceedings before the immigration courts, rather than placing them into expedited removal. In December 2014, advocates brought class-action litigation challenging DHS' categorical detention of asylum-seeking families to deter future migrants. 37 In February 2015, a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting DHS from using deterrence as a rationale for detaining families or as a factor in custody determinations. 38 The court emphatically reaffirmed the premise that immigration detention is civil in nature and as such, it must be justified by a legitimate government interest and not as a form of punishment. It held that depriving a family of liberty to deter another potential migrant, was an impermissible use of detention, and further, that deterrence was unlikely to mitigate any national security threat.
In May 2015, DHS acquiesced, agreeing to individualize custody determination decisions, but still asserting it had the legal authority to detain for deterrence purposes (ICE 2015) . To that end, DHS also announced another process, new in name only, to ". . . further focus immigration enforcement resources on high priority cases," top among them, families who were not part of recent border crossings.
In August 2015, a federal district court held all minors in custody are protected individuals, whether or not accompanied by a parent, and have a right to release.
39 The court ordered DHS to release accompanying mothers to secure the rights of their children to be free from detention; prohibited the use of secure facilities; and required any non-secure facility used by ICE to be licensed.
40 DHS petitioned the court to reconsider its decision but within a month, the court ordered the agency to implement these remedies forthwith.
41 ICE released some families on bond but also expedited the removal of others, many of whom had sought asylum prior to the exhaustion of their appeals. ICE also pursued, unsuccessfully, licensure for Berks, Dilley, and Karnes under the infirm assertion that they are non-secure facilities.
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In sum, DHS continued to pursue the narrowest aims of the court orders, detaining as many families as possible under conditions that had not materially improved. to continually evaluating it. We have concluded that we must make substantial changes to our detention practices when it comes to families" (DHS 2015). Its mandate was "to provide advice and recommendations" on matters concerning ICE's family residential centers including detention management and reform. 43 The venue for providing the advice and recommendations was a report due October 2016.
The Final Months of the Obama Presidency: DHS Advisory Committee on Family Residential Centers
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DHS selected 14 subject matter experts (SME) with expertise in primary education, immigration law, physical and mental health, trauma-informed services, family and youth services, detention management, and detention reform, to serve on the committee. I was among the 14 committee members and over the next year, co-chaired one of the three subcommittees. Between October 2015 and October 2016, the ACFRC met three times in person, and following our tasking in March 2016, usually once a week by phone. With just six months to produce a report of consequence, communication among subcommittee members and across the subcommittees was critical but curtailed. ICE policy required all discussion be on the record, precluding ex parte communication amongst the members. As a result, ICE scheduled the calls at times when designated ICE personnel were available to participate, and permitted email exchanges among committee members when the phone calls were insufficient if they also copied ICE personnel. The committee encountered other and more formidable obstacles to the realization of its charge. Of great consternation, initially ICE narrowed the committee's charge, prohibiting discussion about detention management and reform. The three subcommittees wrote two additional chapters to address those concerns. Additionally, ICE limited the committee's access to the material it had requested to make the informed assessments that DHS had asked us to make. The committee received few of the documents it had requested, and most of them came late. Many of the documents that ICE withheld (for example, executed contracts) are documents routinely placed by state and local governments on their websites.
Notwithstanding these setbacks, within a year of its formation and six months of its charge, on October 7, 2016, the ACFRC unanimously adopted the 166-page report that it had produced, consisting of seven chapters, five appendixes, and 282 recommendations, most notably Recommendation 1-1, which provides in part:
DHS' immigration enforcement practices should operationalize the presumption that detention is generally neither appropriate nor necessary for families -and that detention or the separation of families for purposes of immigration enforcement or management are never in the best interest of children. DHS should discontinue the general use of family detention, reserving it for rare cases when necessary following an individualized assessment of the need to detain because of danger or flight risk that cannot be mitigated by conditions of release. (2015) for the committee charter (n.b., the government changed the name of the committee at some point between its inception and completion of its task.) 44 See ACFRC (2016, 25) . 45 Ibid., 6. 46 The report is available at https://www.ice.gov/acfrc.
The Homeland Security Advisory Council Subcommittee on Privatized Immigration Detention Facilities
Several months prior to the ACFRC's submission of its report and recommendations to Secretary Johnson and Director Saldana, Secretary Johnson formed a subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council to look at ICE's use of privatized immigration detention facilities. The impetus for the tasking was an August 18, 2016, announcement by the US Department of Justice: the attorney general directed the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to reduce and ultimately end its use of private prisons. Initially, the secretary rejected the suggestion that DHS follow suit with a comparable reexamination of ICE's use of private prisons to hold civil detained individuals including families. He dismissed the suggestion outright, stating the situations were not comparable because the time spent by federal prisoners in BOP facilities is longer than that spent by federal detained individuals in ICE facilities. Within a week however, he had reconsidered his position, directing in part that a subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council "… address ICE's current policy and practices concerning the use of private immigration detention facilities and evaluate whether this practice should be eliminated." 47 The subcommittee completed its report on December 1, 2016 (see HSAC 2016).
Top among its core recommendations, but its placement appreciably diminished by the dissention of 17 of its 24 members who dissented from the conclusion that reliance on private prisons should, or inevitably must, continue was this:
Fiscal considerations, combined with the need for realistic capacity to handle sudden increases in detention, indicate that DHS's use of private for-profit detention continue but continuation should come with improved and expanded ICE oversight, and with further exploration of other models to enhance ICE control, responsiveness, and sense of accountability for daily operations at all detention facilities.
(ibid., 2)
Of note are several related and recent dates. On November 3, 2016, a month after the ACFRC submitted its report that contained a number of recommendations to curtail outsourcing, and a month before the subcommittee released its report, ICE extended its contract with CoreCivic 48 until 2021, to operate Dilley as a FRC. On December 3, 2016, two days after the release of the subcommittee's report, the 250th District Court issued its final ruling preventing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services from issuing licenses to CoreCivic to operate Dilley and the GEO Group to operate Karnes as FRCs. The impact of the ruling is clear -until Dilley and Karnes achieve stature as non-secure and licensed facilities, pursuant to the Flores Agreement, ICE may not use them to detain families. The Texas attorney general is appealing (see Crowther, n.d.) .
It is unlikely that the Trump administration will call upon the ACFRC or even read its report. However, given the considerable and conscientious effort that the committee made to provide meaningful, implementation-worthy recommendations to DHS, its members have been particularly disheartened to learn that conditions at the facilities slipped, rather than improved, during the final days of the Obama administration and the first days of the Trump administration.
ICE's Intentions and Activities: Incarcergration
I joined DHS at the beginning of the Obama administration. Before then, I worked primarily in large city jail and state correctional systems in senior management positions.
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Upon appointment, my primary assignment was to document ICE's detention and removal policies and practices, and in its place oversee implementation of a civil, civil system of oversight for individuals awaiting determinations of relief or removal (DHS 2009).
Throughout my tenure in Washington, DC, I spent much of the time in the field. I toured the facilities that ICE used in every part of the country and spoke with its enforcement agents and attorneys, sheriffs' staff and private prison personnel, the people ICE had detained as well as released, and their attorneys and advocates. I gathered agency data, reviewed reports by government agencies and human rights organizations, and analyzed the information. The impressions that I formed about ICE's activities and its operation during the first facility tours stayed with me to the last. Everything that I have seen or heard since then, fortifies those findings. Reminiscent of an article that I had read as an undergraduateBody Ritual of the Nacirema (Miner 1956 ) -it struck me that ICE approached detention of immigrants in much the same manner as had the fictitious anthropologist who came upon the Nacirema. 50 His observations of the Nacirema people were without context. His lack of knowledge about and empathy for the actors he observed and his inability to understand their actions left him clueless. I thought it strikingly similar to our government's handling of foreign-born persons in its custody.
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, publisher of the blog crImmigration.com, argues persuasively that policymakers likely turned to criminal law and procedure -crImmigration as it is now known (García Hernández 2014) -to legitimize the exclusion of the foreignborn deemed to be undesirable. In the same way, correction policy and practice has been used to manage the foreign-born in civil custody. Anil Kalhan, chair of the International Human Rights Committee of the New York City Bar Association, effectively makes the case that for many noncitizens, the experience of detention is as punitive as incarceration and a deprivation as severe as removal. Kalhan posits that if the overall convergence has given rise to crImmigration law, 51 then excessive immigration detention practices as those described in my report (Schriro 2009 ) have also morphed into a para-punitive system, immcarceration (Kalhan 2010 ; see also Kalhan 2014) . My perspective as practitioner, errant ethnographer, and non-practicing attorney, is similar to those of García Hernández and Kalhan, but it is not at all the same. I am particularly interested in the conflation of what should be clear distinctions within and between the criminal and civil justice systems and the many people under its control. The following facets are especially illustrative of the inclination to see the populations as interchangeable, and predictive of the ways in which we respond to both of them. They are: (1) the administrative purposes of each form of incapacitation; (2) the case law that governs the criminal and civil systems; (3) the needs and risks that each population presents; (4) the extent to which the public, press, and policymakers are aware of these differences; (5) the unique sensibilities and skills sets each workforce needs to satisfy its system's minimum requirements; and (6) the requisite infrastructure to support each system's goals and objectives.
If I were to give the criminalization of immigration a name, I would call it incarcergration. Pervasive points of view and prejudices conflate the roles and responsibilities of decisionmakers, the legal bases and limitations for the decisions they make, the inferences drawn from detention and its trappings, the rights really afforded the accused, and the wholesale adoption of one set of strategies for a wholly different set of circumstances.
There are statutory distinctions between the administrative purposes of civil detention and criminal incarceration. They are noteworthy but widely unknown. Many people, including those who work in these facilities and members of the press corps, believe both suspects are remanded to jail and the guilty are sentenced to prison for punishment. They also believe the foreign-born in ICE detention facilities and FRCs are guilty, and that there are no mitigating circumstances and detention should be punitive. In fact, neither pre-trial criminal detention nor civil detention may ever be for a punitive purpose. Only after a plea or conviction may the criminal court impose a sentence of incarceration as punishment.
The public is also largely unaware of the extent to which the protections afforded the accused vary. The criminal justice system has many decision makers, each with distinct duties at every decision point and each one acting independently of the others. In marked contrast, to varying degrees, both CBP and ICE determine who to stop, question, and take into custody, who to release and under what conditions, who to detain and how long, and where to detain persons in its custody and under what conditions. In sum, DHS is short on checks and balances. The criminal justice system assures that the accused -citizens and noncitizens alike -receive the "Miranda" warning and are provided counsel if they cannot afford representation under most circumstances. The civil justice system does not.
The case law concerning the care that government must afford persons in criminal and civil custody also differs widely. The development of correction law over the past number of years has measurably improved conditions of confinement for both pre-trial and sentenced prisoners. The correction case law is also the basis for correctional standards. In combination, corrections case law and correctional standards set a basis for minimum operating expectations, a basis for that which is constitutional. On the other hand, there is little case law specific to civil detention. Where it exists, it primarily concerns ICE's family residential centers (FRCs), but ICE has failed to incorporate any of the provisions in Flores into its FRC standards. 52 As inadequate and inappropriate as correctional standards are for anyone in ICE's custody, if, in fact, ICE adhered to those standards, then conditions would improve markedly and immediately.
There is also considerable hyperbole about the risk that immigrants present. ICE has long asserted that it goes after only the "worst of the worst." In 2009, the report demonstrated this was not the case. Most detainees had no criminal record and among those who did, just over 10 percent were Uniform Crime Reporting Part I crimes. The majority were traffic offenses, simple assault, and larceny (Schriro 2009, 6) . DHS recently announced it would release weekly declined detainer outcome reports that would include "notable criminal activity" (ICE 2017) . DHS released just three weekly reports then suspended publication due to numerous complaints by state and local jurisdictions that ICE had mischaracterized their actions as "uncooperative." Although the information released by DHS is limited, it suggests a significant shift in focus from the removal of persons with final dispositions to those with dropped charges, another complementary finding to a comprehensive study conducted at the midpoint of the Obama administration (Kerwin 2015) .
As both García Hernández and Kalhan have suggested, our fear of persons who do not look like us, speak our language, or worship as we do, is advanced through legal policy and practice. I am concerned that these beliefs harden with ICE's continued use of private prisons, county jails, and electronic monitoring. The razor-ribbon fences, the correctional personnel staffing the facilities, the orange jumpsuits issued to the people it detains and the manner in which they are managed -standing counts throughout the day, scheduled and unscheduled searches and shakedowns, random drug testing, personal property limitations and the like -all mirror the ways in which criminals are confined. Adoption of the correctional principles of care, custody, and control imposes more restrictions and incurs more cost than are necessary to manage effectively the vast majority of this particular population. In fact, the majority of people that ICE encounters are contributing members of intact families; they have job skills and are employed or employable; they own or owned homes; they pay taxes; and they vote in the countries that permitted participation. There is no basis in fact to treat the vast majority of persons subject to mandatory detention as ICE treats them, but for the medium it selected to use to detain them.
ICE is composed primarily of law enforcement personnel with extensive expertise performing removal functions, but not in the design and delivery of non-secure facilities and community-based alternatives. ICE's inclination to approach everyone in its custody as a hazard to the homeland is consistent with its enforcement orientation. This is why ICE's agents and attorneys should not be its primary decision makers, and, to the extent that ICE must detain or place anyone on community supervision, it should call upon individuals with expertise in these areas to assume these responsibilities.
ICE continues to expand its capacity to monitor and confine persons in its custody but not to put into place the systems needed to sustain lawfully and humanely such an undertaking. ICE operates the largest system of incarceration in the country and it does so without the policies and practices imbedded in the case law that have advanced the field of corrections and the incarceration of pre-trial defendants and sentenced prisoners. It does so without any of the organizational infrastructure necessary to operate a system of any size effectively and efficiently, and without mastering the most basic management tools to provide adequately for children, adults, the ill, infirm and elderly, persons whose primary language is other than English, or asylum seekers. ICE's current, rapid expansion of enforcement activities is not a basis to relax or relinquish the gains realized over the past several years. It pays a significant sum for the beds that it buys. There is no reason not to demand as much, or more, in exchange from those with which it contracts. Instead, ICE should build upon these reforms, employing the management tools and informational systems now in place, affirming its relationships with the legal community and community partners, and accurately conveying its activities to Congress and the country.
Conclusions and Recommendations
I wrote most of this article in the final months of the Obama administration. At that time, my perspective of the past two terms was something of a glass half-full point of view. My thought at the time was that the policy and practice of incarcerating families are infirm but when families are held, the FRCs must meet the court's minimum expectations. Instead of steady progress, ICE was stuck if not backsliding, as the Obama administration ended. 53 Among its many deficiencies, access to counsel was more erratic than earlier in the president's tenure. ICE made it more difficult for pro-bono counsel to access the attorney-client consultation rooms and for law students and support staff to accompany the lawyers. Attorneys also encountered greater difficulty meeting with their clients at Dilley and Karnes. Reports also began to surface again of CBP agents not permitting asylum seekers to enter the United States as is required by law. Episodic reports of CBP agents telling asylum seekers who presented themselves at ports of entry that they could not do so, they had to come back another day, or they had to make an appointment with Mexican authorities rose once again (Partlow 2016 ).
Prior to publication, I was able to review and refresh the paper after the first several months of the Trump administration. During that time the policy and practice of ICE detention has become so egregious that the existence, expansion, and operation of FRCs seemed benign by comparison. The glass is now half-empty. The case law that has come about since the inception of FRCs, largely by means of Flores, has come undone. Now CPB is separating children from their parents at the border, rendering the minor children "unaccompanied," remanding the older children to adult detention facilities as adults, but not with their adult family members (see CSSP 2017; KTLA 5 2017a,b; WRC, LIRS, and KIND 2017) .
In any administration -indeed, in every administration -DHS's main mission is national emergency planning and preparedness. Influxes of individuals at our borders, seeking safety and freedom, are an integral part of our history. In all instances, it is essential that DHS adequately anticipate and lawfully address these periodic increases in families with children and others. History teaches that these influxes are certain to happen in response to onerous conditions that prompt people in other countries to migrate. While marked changes in policy from one administration to the next is an integral part of our nation's history, DHS must put in place competent and comprehensive policies and practices that address the unique needs of families -a critical undertaking that requires a commitment to continuous 53 Oversight of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 114th Congress, Second Session, September 22, 2016, Serial No. 114-94 . U.S. Government Publishing Office, Washington: 2016. The purpose of the hearing was to ". . . examine how our immigration laws are enforced and how this enforcement affects our communities" (ibid., 2). improvement, well-reasoned and thoroughly researched solutions, and hard work. This is what any administration should do. This is what we should hold them accountable to do.
Specific Remedies: Karnes, Dilley, and Berks Family Residential Centers
The Flores Agreement established binding standards for the detention and treatment of immigrant children in government custody in 1997. Nearly 20 years has passed and the US government continues to resist compliance with Flores when it should embrace its tenets in full. To this end, ICE should immediately cease the expansion of the Karnes, Dilley, and Berks RFCs and release as many families as are permitted by law. Further, ICE should provide timely notice that it will not renew any of its family detention contracts. To the extent that ICE needs beds for only the briefest detention of any families, DHS must use only non-secure and licensed facilities, all of them small in scale and situated in easily assessable communities.
Overall Reform of Detention Policies and Practices Affecting Families and Children
My experiences working at ICE at the beginning of the Obama administration's first term and serving in a volunteer capacity as a member of the ACFRC at the end of its second term reaffirmed several significant observations about making change happen. First, the inclination of organizations to resist change is deeply ingrained, more so when there is significant tension between its perceived mission and its mandate. This is certainly the case with ICE, which is expert in enforcement but is also responsible for the safety and wellbeing of detained individuals, despite its lack of affinity for and expertise in this area, from their apprehension through adjudication to removal or relief. Second, individual change agents acting under the auspices of authority can find and fix any number of deficiencies, but a critical mass of like-minded agents in the field is necessary to keep the processes on course and to sustain what the several change agents achieve. Establishing the Office of Detention Policy and Planning (ODPP) to diagnose problems and develop solutions but not to authorize it to undertake the implementation and enforcement of those reforms is a significant -and likely an insurmountable -impediment. On the other hand, anything that an organization fails to do or undoes, the administration can fix, if it so chooses. The Obama administration did not. The 2009 report was its roadmap to reform the detention system and although adopted in full in the end, it chose not to prioritize its implementation. ODPP was the means by which the Obama administration would accomplish its recommendations. Within the first 100 days of the Trump administration, DHS announced ODPP would close, shuttering for now any executive branch efforts to ensure those in its custody are afforded basic protections (Dickerson 2017a ; see also Schriro 2017) .
The decision to detain foreign-born persons is sometimes necessary as a matter of law, but more often than not, it is discretionary. Less discretion by government actors and clearer direction and more oversight by the government would produce better results more quickly. As suggested by recent reports of CBP agents along the border exercising impermissible discretion, the government should immediately provide clearer direction and more oversight, not less, to ensure compliance with law by its agents as well as asylum seekers. Likewise, the government should ensure ICE agents afford foreign-born families all of the protections provided by law. Although the pre-election posture of the Trump administration suggests this is unlikely to occur, it should not approach the following obligations as optional.
First, case law prohibits deterrence-based detention policies. Rather than pursue nominal changes, such as licensing FRCs that have not met minimum requirements and insisting secure facilities are non-secure, ICE should adopt a presumption against detention, particularly in the case of families, women, and asylum seekers. ICE should also make every effort to mitigate impediments to community placement. When timely release into the community is not feasible, ICE should release families intact on their own recognizance or on parole. To ensure its decisions are informed and uniform, ICE should use validated instruments to individualize determinations of the least restrictive means to ensure court appearances. ICE should make these assessments, and not delegate these important decisions to vendors, who will likely act in their own financial self-interest. Where detention is required, it should not be lengthy. When alternatives suffice, individual circumstances should serve as the basis for their formulation. The least restrictive means is always the preferred option. ICE should only employ electronic monitoring, cash bond, and other more restrictive means when demonstrably necessary.
Secondly, to realize these results, ICE must acquire the expertise within its ranks to create and maintain the infrastructure necessary to perform all of the unique duties associated with detention and its alternatives. These skill sets include the writing and revision of written instruction, the training and retraining of personnel, and the selection and replacement of providers. Imbued in everything that it does, ICE must establish and adhere to clear standards of care that do not follow a penal model and are responsive to families, women, and asylum seekers. This involves, in part, establishing a system of informed immigration enforcement, including management tools and informational systems capable of building and maintaining a continuum of care for those who must remain in ICE custody.
54 Absent this infrastructure, it is unlikely that ICE will base its community placements or detention strategies on objective, individually assessed risk and need or utilize the least restrictive means to achieve compliance. If the Trump administration is unwilling or unable to make this happen, then Congress or the courts should expand the charge of ODPP (Dickerson 2017a) to include executing all decisions regarding detention and alternatives to detention or relocate ODPP to the Office of the DHS Secretary. In either case, operating independently from ICE would position ODPP to mirror the criminal justice system's checks and balances in the civil system's decision making.
Lastly, there must be a commitment to excellence, transparency, and accountability within DHS and throughout the three branches of the government. There are many examples of strong and appropriate agency efforts, court involvement, and Congressional oversight but none of them has been sufficiently swift or sustained to achieve their intended outcomes. Meaningful reform will also require the active and on-going participation by its partners, 54 Given the government's renewed emphasis on raids to achieve more rapid removals, families placed in expedited removal proceedings should receive an individualized custody assessment immediately after a credible or reasonable fear finding, taking into account the family's individual circumstances and the specific likelihood that they pose a flight risk or danger to the community. notably, the legal community and advocacy organizations. It will "take a village" to undertake an endeavor as comprehensive as this one, but this village will have the capacity to create a smarter, stronger, and sustainable state. To ensure that the United States realizes its commitment to continuous improvement leadership should ensure that an effective complaint mechanism is in place, that performance metrics are collected, and outcomes published to inform decision making and assure stakeholders that there is sufficient accountability within the system.
The Trump Challenge: Truth or Consequences
Depending upon one's policy and politics, the first 100 days of the Trump administration have been either very dark or bright. Many have said the same of the Obama administration. At one time or another, all of us may be tempted to tamp back our efforts, let go of higher expectations, wait for the next administration, or push back and soldier on. Whatever our position, our collective time may be better served looking for common ground, core values, and a shared sense of our higher selves, proud to be the nation known for taking in the tired and the weary, a country committed to fresh starts and second chances.
In the end, our government consists of three branches, each with its own standing and strength. The executive branch can only do that which the legislative and judiciary branches allow, and the legislative and judicial branches can undo some of what the executive does. Then, of course, there are all of us, the citizenry. That gives all of us many opportunities in every administration to unite and get it right, to make and sustain sufficient improvements, so that in our country there are no longer children weeping in the playtime of the others.
